DOCUMENT RESUME

ED 285 226 CS 505 670

AUTHOR Makus, Anne L.
TITLE In the Name of Peace.
PUB DATE Nov 86
NOTE 21p.; Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Speech Communication Association (72nd, Chicago, IL, November 13-16, 1986).
PUB TYPE Speeches/Conference Papers (150) -- Reports - Research/Technical (143)

EDRS PRICE MF01/PC01 Plus Postage.
DESCRIPTORS Communication Research; Communism; Comparative Analysis; Conflict Resolution; Cultural Influences; Democratic Values; *Disarmament; *Discourse Analysis; Foreign Policy; Ideology; International Relations; *Language Usage; *Peace; Political Attitudes; Semantics; Speeches
IDENTIFIERS *Gorbachev (Mikhail); *Reagan (Ronald); Strategic Defense Initiative; United States; USSR

ABSTRACT

United States President Ronald Reagan and Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev have strongly emphasized in several speeches that their ultimate goal is peace between their respective nations. However, this apparent shared goal has not come about, largely because they lack a common understanding of the meaning of peace. Both have stated that they wish for the elimination of all nuclear weapons some day, but Gorbachev contends that the United States disrupts chances for "fairness and equality" with plans for developing the Strategic Defense Initiative, or Star Wars defense system. Reagan believes that the Soviets interfere with peace initiatives by "interfering in regional conflicts," such as Afghanistan. Hence, their opinions of what will bring about peace are entirely different. More importantly, when Reagan discusses peace, he uses words such as honor, human dignity, faith, courage, and love--essentially, freedom from control. Gorbachev discusses peace as freedom to control, to build socialism, and looks at the American perspective of freedom as freedom from responsibility, and freedom to exploit other nations economically. Finally, both contend they are working toward democracy, but the Soviet perception of democracy includes ideas of equal position and equal goods, while the American perception only includes the right to pursue such goods. Clearly, peaceful relations between the Soviets and the Americans cannot come about when the misunderstanding of such terms fosters distrust and suspicion. (Sixteen references are included.) (JC)

****
* Reproductions supplied by EDRS are the best that can be made *
* from the original document. *
****

ED285226

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION
Office of Educational Research and Improvement
EDUCATIONAL RESOURCES INFORMATION CENTER (ERIC)

This document has been reproduced as received from the person or organization originating it.

☐ Minor changes have been made to improve reproduction quality.

• Points of view or opinions stated in this document do not necessarily represent official OERI position or policy.

In the Name of Peace

by

Anne L. Makus

"PERMISSION TO REPRODUCE THIS MATERIAL HAS BEEN GRANTED BY

Anne Makus

TO THE EDUCATIONAL RESOURCES INFORMATION CENTER (ERIC)."

CS505670

Ms. Makus is a final year PhD student at The Pennsylvania State University

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

> Men are of one mind when they possess reason to judge statements of truth, understanding to appreciate statements of their own values and those of others, desires ordered under freedom, and love of the common good for which men are associated. When men are of one mind in these abilities, they can be of different opinions without danger to society or to each other.
>
> Richard McKeon[1]

It seems apparent to most people who read newspapers or magazines or listen to radio or television news that the Soviet Union and the United States share a common ideal: peace. Hardly a speech, interview or remark is made by the leaders of either country without peace being mentioned. It seems reasonable to infer that if two nations ardently share such an ideal then its implementation should follow with little difficulty. However, in the case of the Soviet Union and the United States it has not; that is, their supposed sharing of the ideal of peace has not resulted in the actual state of peace, peace not just as the absence of combat but the absence of the threat of combat. It is my contention in this essay that this absence of peace results from their lack of a common conception of peace.

I am arguing that what they lack is a shared perceptual foundation that suggests and encourages cooperative resolution of problematic situations such as arms control, the Strategic Defense Initiative,[2] or regional conflicts. Implicit in this claim is that agreements over arms control, SDI, and regional conflicts are not pivotal to peace. What is pivotal to peace is freedom from essential disharmony, discord, disagreement, hostility. By "essential" I mean

to specify discord or disagreement not as it might rise and fall based upon an unhappy circumstance that two parties disagree upon--like France disagreeing with the United States' bombing military targets in Libya--but rather on the level of unshared ideals of such scope and magnitude as breed hostility between those who do not share them. The relations between Great Britain and the United States or between West Germany and the United States may be seen as examples reflecting a shared ideal of peace. It is not that they do not argue or disagree, or that they do not maintain conflicting perceptions and stances in the world, but that at the basis of their contacts is an underlying shared ideal of peace that inherently invites mutually beneficial resolutions of problems.

Beginning with the premise that the Soviet Union and the United States do not really share the ideal of peace, I will go on to explore what it is that constitutes the appearance of a shared ideal, what actually constitutes the ideals of peace for the Soviet Union and the United States, and what implications this holds for the study of peace rhetoric.

In march, 1985, Mikhail Gorbachev became Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. In January, 1985, Ronald Reagan began his second term as President of the United States. In order to discover what constitutes peace as an ideal, I have examined four pairs of speeches in which the leaders address peace, beginning with Gorbachev's and Reagan's inaugural addresses.[3] The second pair are primarily addresses on economic issues but include subjects related to peace.[4] I have included these because of the significance attached by the United Nations to Gorbachev's Dnepropetrovsk Plant address,

as well as for the discussion of peace within the overall context of economic issues. Reagan's and Gorbachev's May addresses commemorating the end of World War II focus upon peace, both past and present.[5] Finally, the messages given by Reagan and Gorbachev following their November Summit meeting in Geneva will be considered.[6] In addition, I have included an extract of Gorbachev's November 27, 1985, address to the Supreme Soviet[7] and Reagan's address of November 15, concerning the upcoming Summit meeting[8] because of their emphasis upon peace.

The following analysis and interpretation is grounded in Aristotelian and especially Ciceronian perceptions. A number of terms have been used to approach the relationship between theory and practice: dialectic/logistic, wisdom/eloquence, philosophy/rhetoric, ideal/practice, to name a few. The relationship that is expressed is frequently that of diremption between the two members. Michael Buckley, in "Philosophic Method in Cicero," writes: "It is an unexamined assumption of our times that rhetoric and philosophy are univocally separate and exclusive provinces. . . ."[9] The gap is not, however, a modern development. Socrates, according to Cicero, gave birth to the separation between theory and practice:

> This is the source from which has sprung the undoubtedly absurd and unprofitable and reprehensible severance between the tongue and the brain, leading to our having one set of professors to teach us to think and another to teach us to speak.[10]

The separation, Cicero claims, is false, for "in reality they are closely linked together."[11] Richard McKeon, in "Discussion and Resolution in Political Conflicts," agrees that theory and practice are linked:

> the resolution of conflicts is primarily a problem of principles in the original and continuing sense of a beginning, since the facts which set the problem are affected by the choice of principles and since, in the lines of action advocated for the solution of the problem, principles are ends which are to be achieved by alteration of initial circumstances.[12]

Defining the relationship betwen theory and practice more precisely, McKeon also writes:

> but in a practical art all action is for the sake of some end, and the rules of action take their whole character and color from the end to which they are subservient.[13]

We see from the above statements by Buckley, Cicero, and McKeon that although theory and practice are often taken to exist separately, in reality they do not. Rather, action is informed by theory, by what is perceived to be ideal. Action, in other words, is principled. Thus, if the leaders of one nation are to understand the actions taken by another nation, the former must understand the principles, the ideals upon which the latter's actions are based.

As we observed in the beginning of this essay, to claim to share an ideal may not be enough. Before that claim can be validly made, it is necessary to understand what the ideal consists of, that is, what meaning is embodied in the term. This is, in part, what Cicero addresses in his attempt to unify wisdom and eloquence. In his discussion of Cicero's method of Controversia--the clash of statements in ongoing conversation--Buckley identifies the necessity of understanding the terms used:

> the operational method allows one to distinguish semantic variations from actual disagreement. . . . This method can reveal either a common consent underlying the linguistic divergences or a differing understanding underlying a common proposition or term.[14]

While I do not intend to add to the effort begun by Aristotle and continued by Cicero, Buckley, and McKeon to mend the division between rhetoric and philosophy, or theory and practice, I have intended to show that only by considering the practice in terms of the ideals underpinning it is it possible to accurately interpret actions taken and words spoken by a party.

Although it seems, from an analysis of the speeches, that the guarantee of peace comes in the form of arms control agreements, such agreements, while they may be means, are not the essential criterion of peace. In fact, the ideals underlying such agreements are more basic to peace, serving as the condition for agreement on arms control. Yet, at the same time, it is arms control upon which discussion at Geneva focuses and that captures the media's attention. Although not an ideal, arms control is portrayed as a sort of ideal to be achieved. Examination of arms control discussion reveals agreement between the two parties. Both Reagan and Gorbachev agree that reduction in nuclear armament is essential to peace. In fact, they both state in the speeches examined that what they really want is total elimination of nuclear arms. Reagan, in his address on World War II, declares: "We seek the total elimination, one day, of nuclear weapons from the face of the earth." Gorbachev, in his inaugural address, describes his major goal as "the full destruction and banning forever of nuclear weapons." To begin with, they have both agreed to work for a fifty percent reduction in their nuclear arsenals. Reagan states in his post-Summit speech:

> specifically, we agreed in Geneva that each side should move to cut offensive nuclear arms by fifty percent in appropriate categories. In our joint statement we called for early progress on this, turning the talks toward our chief goal, offensive reductions.

Further, they both agree that tough verification standards on both sides are necessary and acceptable to ensure the reductions. In addition, Reagan reports that they both agree upon no first strike, prevention of nuclear proliferation, renunciation of propaganda of war, elimination of use of chemical weapons, and control of conventional forces.

These are not the only agreements made. No division exists between them in their expectations for arms talks. Although Gorbachev speaks more about the value and necessity of talks, especially in his post-Summit message, both adhere solidly to the perception that talks are necessary. They also agree upon the nature of those talks. They should be open, frank, constructive, productive; and the participants should be direct, clear, and speak with candor. Furthermore, Reagan and Gorbachev agree to meet six months later and again in a year to do more talking.

In addition to a shared viewpoint on talks, Reagan and Gorbachev agree upon engaging in joint ventures. In his address to Congress following the Summit meetings, Reagan emphasizes the desirability of increasing joint ventures. He outlines agreements made, including exchanges of academics, artists, and youths. Agreements on air safety, establishment of consulates, and the decision to work together on nuclear fusion are forthcoming as well. Gorbachev, in his Dnepropetrovsk speech, advocates "the development of a political dialogue and mutual interaction with capitalist countries, for the broad development of mutually beneficial trade and economic, scientific, technological and cultural ties; we ready to develop these on a long-term basis."

From the above it would appear that arms control agreement, talks, and joint ventures provide the stuff of peace. But, one may inquire, if there is

such consensus between the Soviets and the Americans, then why have agreements not been reached? Carrying our analysis further, it appears that the completion of actual arms control agreements is dependent upon resolution of conflicts over SDI and regional conflicts, as if these are the subsidiary ideals constitutive of peace. The assumption is that if agreements can be reached regarding SDI and regional conflicts, then arms control can be accomplished and peace will be guaranteed. A diagram of the apparent contingencies of peace follows:



Gorbachev persistently and insistently throughout his addresses denounces Reagan's SDI program, and Reagan defends it, including denunciation of the Soviet Union's own research into outer space defense research. Reagan's major concern, on the other hand, is with Soviet intervention in what he terms "regional conflicts." Gorbachev responds defensively both by denying Reagan's accusations and by denouncing United States involvement in colonial countries, the term he uses in place of regional conflicts. In his address to the Supreme Soviet, Gorbachev attacks SDI intensely, arguing that "'Star Wars' is the main obstacle to agreement on arms control." Apparently convinced of its profound threat, Gorbachev claims that the "'Star Wars' program will not only lead to a further arms race, but it will mean that all restraint will be blown to the

wind." This is one of the most moderate statements he makes. In his speech to the Dnepropetrovsk Plant workers, Gorbachev denounces SDI vehemently:

> The Americans have not only failed to put forward any serious proposals in Geneva for curtailing the arms race, but on the contrary, are taking steps that make such a curtailment impossible. I am thinking of the so-called 'star wars' program to create offensive space weapons. Talk of its supposed defensive nature is, of course, a fairy tale for the gullible. The idea is to attempt to paralyze the Soviet Union's strategic arms and guarantee the opportunity of an unpunished nuclear strike against our country.

He accuses the United States of trying to secure "strategic superiority and achieve world dominance." Clearly, any peace achieved with the United States as dominant would not be, in Gorbachev's words, a "just peace," a fair and equitable peace, which is the ideal Gorbachev subscribes to. Peace--just peace--demands equality, not dominance of one nation over another. Gorbachev continually speaks throughout his speeches of equality, mutual respect, cooperation based upon equality, and fairness. For him, Reagan's SDI program violates this essential ideal, for it would, he claims, put the United States militarily in a strategically superior position to the Soviet Union, truncating equality and thus cooperation. We can see that here, at the point of contest, we gain insight into the real bases of conflict: the underlying ideals.

Reagan's defense of SDI does not address the ideal of equality in his post-Summit address to Congress. Rather, he maintains the description of SDI as "our research effort that envisions the possibility of defensive systems which could ultimately protect all nations against the danger of nuclear war" to "bring much closer the safer, more stable world we seek." He also maintains that the Soviets are engaged in more than space research themselves:

> We are offering to permit Soviet experts to see first hand that SDI does not involve offensive weapons. American scientists would be allowed to visit comparable facilities of the Soviet strategic defensive program, which, in fact, has involved much more than research for many years.

The explicit point of stasis in this debate is whether the program is defensive or not. The ideal of equality, which is more profoundly at issue, is not explicitly addressed.

Reagan assumes the major offensive role in the debate over regional conflicts. He accuses the Soviets of expansionism in such areas as Cambodia, Afghanistan, Nicaragua, Angola, Ethiopia, Laos. Clearly, its antithesis--non-intervention in other nations' affairs and thus circumscription of Soviet influence--are the behaviors to which Reagan would have the Soviets adhere. It is primarily in this context that Reagan calls for freedom. The ideal of freedom is spoken of almost as frequently as peace in the addresses examined. In his inaugural and his speech on World War II, freedom was referred to more than any other ideal. Reagan states in his inaugural address that "freedom is our best ally and it is the world's only hope to conquer poverty and preserve peace," and that "Every victory for human freedom will be a victory for world peace." Clearly, peace and freedom are linked ideals, freedom even acting as a means to peace in Reagan's vision. In his pre-Summit radio address, Reagan accuses the Soviet Union of denying freedom and threatening peace:

> nations do not distrust each other because they're armed; they arm themselves because they distrust each other. The use of force, subversion, and terror has made the world a more dangerous place. And thus, today, there's no peace in Cambodia, no peace in Angola, Ethiopia or Nicaragua.

For Reagan, freedom is fundamental to peace. Just as Gorbachev maintains that equality--in the form of SDI being scrapped--must exist in order for the Geneva Summit to be successful, so Reagan, in his pre-Summit address, maintains that "freedom [in the form of non-totalitarian expansionism]. . . is essential for success at Geneva."

As Reagan offers a defense for United States' development of SDI, so Gorbachev offers a defense for Soviet actions abroad. In his address on World War II, he claims that "The Soviet people do not need land belonging to others. We do not impose our world outlook and way of life on anyone." Also, as Reagan counters Gorbachev's attack on SDI with an offensive play, so Gorbachev attacks the United States policy toward the newly liberated colonial states. He claims that the imperialist states

> have been exploiting the labor and robbing the natural resources of colonies, and have kept their peoples in poverty. Now they are trying to tie them to the system of capitalism, using all means to do so--economic, military, through threats and intimidation, paltry hand-outs and bribes. A firm noose of debt has already been over many of them and is being pulled tighter and tighter. They are trying to prescribe to young states what sort of policy they should pursue at home. They overthrow and kill those who are undesirable or disobedient. This is the usual practice of the so-called states of the Free World pursuing colonialist policy.

Gorbachev's counter-attack is centered on economic bondage; that is, he blames the imperialist states--like the United States--for keeping peoples economically suppressed by "un-free" methods. Reagan's attack, on the other hand, is more in character, centering upon the claim that the Soviet Union keeps the human spirit of man in bondage. Reagan's concern with morality is reflected in the frequent use of terms such as honor, human dignity, faith, courage, love. Reflecting

their respective materialist and moralist views, one charges the other of exploitation and the other profers charges of totalitarianism.

Both are essentially concerned with the influence of the other on colonial-regional affairs, and for good reason. They both wish to promote their respective ideals of socialism and democracy abroad. In his inaugural address, Gorbachev states: "We will do every thing dependent upon us to broaden interaction with all the socialist states and to enhance the role of influence of socialism in world affairs." Reagan states in his inaugural address that progress is, among other things, America courageously supporting "the struggle for individual liberty, self-government and free enterprise throughout the world and [turning] the tide of history away from totalitarian darkness and into the warm sunlight of human freedom."

Particularly noteworthy about the colonial/regional debate is the way both leaders employ the ideal of freedom in berating the other's behavior and in defending their own. This ideal invites further consideration. Burke's cluster-agon analysis, as described by Carol Berthold,[15] illuminates the issue. When Reagan talks about the ideal of peace, certain other ideals are frequently clustered with it. Freedom, as alluded to earlier, is its most frequent companion, peace being the goal and freedom its guide, as he says in his post-Summit speech. While freedom is linked with peace, human dignity and human spirit are frequently linked with freedom. So is democracy. Democracy, as the system fostering and guaranteeing freedom, is what allows human dignity and the human spirit to flourish in the world. The antithesis to freedom is totalitarianism and ideology. The totalitarian system is antithetical to the

democratic system. Ideology is what shuts out, suffocates freedom, he claims. And, of course, Reagan characterizes the Soviet Union as being both totalitarian and ideological.

Gorbachev, as we have seen, views American freedom as freedom for exploitation. The Americans do not, he claims, want to spread and foster a just freedom abroad but simply want the freedom to exploit the peoples of the world for their own American economic advantage. Freedom, he claims, means to the United States lack of restraint, lack of responsibility, ultimately the freedom to gain superiority and domination not only economically but militarily as well. The proposals of the United States, Gorbachev argues in his address to the Supreme Soviet, are aimed at one end: "military superiority for the United States and NATO as a whole."

Gorbachev, although not with the frequency of Reagan, also lauds freedom as an ideal. In his speech at the Dnepropetrovsk Plant, he identifies with the peoples who have "freed themselves from colonialism." In his inaugural address, Gorbachev speaks of freedom and peace as a "common human goal." But Gorbachev most frequently links progress with peace. Linked with peace and progress is equality, and democracy. While the capitalists desire freedom to exploit and dominate others, Gorbachev maintains, the Sovet Union wants freedom to develop democratic socialism, which, he claims, is the creative path of progress of all peoples. Gorbachev does not view freedom as freedom <u>from</u> control (as does the United States), but as freedom <u>to</u> control, that is, freedom to create universal, social development. Socialism is the democratic path upon which all people may walk in equality, no one exploiting or interfering in the

internal affairs of another. Gorbachev generally speaks of social development in universal terms. He refers continually, especially in the post-Summit address, to "the peoples," "the world," and "every people."

Reflected in his concern for universal social development, Gorbachev speaks of responsibility as often as he speaks of SDI in his post-Summit address. He emphasizes the necessity of "responsible dialogue," "responsibility for the fate of the world," and "responsibility for the future of the world." The antithesis for Gorbachev is exploitation and oppression, that which is irresponsible, unequal, undemocratic, unprogressive and causing disunity among the peoples of the world.

Both Reagan and Gorbachev are concerned with realness--"true peace," "real peace," and "genuine democracy." The key is in the adjective denoting the real essential character of the phenomena. When Reagan alludes to the Soviet Union as not being democratic and not respecting human rights, Gorbachev responds by saying that the Soviet Union is interested in "genuine democracy" and "real human rights." When Gorbachev speaks of democracy and human rights, Reagan speaks of illusions and realism. For Reagan peace must be "true peace," peace informed by freedom. For Gorbachev peace must be "just peace," peace informed by equality and fairness. Clearly, mutual understanding of the meanings each attaches to the ideals constitutive of peace and thus a shared ideal of peace is lacking. The basic disagreements center around the ideals of equality and freedom as reflected in SDI and regional conflicts respectively, both of which are fundamental to agreements in arms reductions. To understand the nature of the disagreements (and agreements) between Gorbachev and Reagan, we

must look at the ideals included in their notions of "real peace." The rhetoric surrounding arms reduction, SDI, and regional conflicts provides a comprehensive view. It is here that the apparent conflict among ideals surfaces. We might diagram each one's conception of what constitues "real peace" as follows:

UNITED STATES	HUMAN DIGNITY OPPORTUNITY DEMOCRACY FREEDOM ↑ PEACE ↓
SOVIET UNION	PROGRESS DEMOCRACY RESPONSIBILITY HAPPINESS OF ALL PEOPLES

These are the ideals that inform the actions of each nation, that direct and justify their activities without being understood and thus unable to be endorsed by the other side. The misunderstandings are caused by interpreting the terms in each leader's own framework, instead of within the context of the other's meaning. Let us return to the concept of democracy for a moment. It is not surprising that the Americans and Soviets both think the other is lying when they each claim to be the keepers of true democracy, for what they mean by the term is different for each. By democracy Gorbachev means fair and equal treatment and collegial decision making. For example, the Soviet Union values the right of everyone to have a job. Democracy for Reagan means freedom from

dictatorship and the freedom of choice. For example, although not everyone is guaranteed a job, everyone is guaranteed the right to choose his or her job. What is allowed within one meaning may not be allowed within the other, and vice versa. What the United States sees as central to the process of democracy, the Soviets condemn as an instrument of oppression:

> But from this capitalist democracy--this is inevitably narrow and stealthily pushes aside the poor, and is therefore hypocritical and false through and through--forward development does not proceed simply, directly and smoothly, towards 'greater and greater democracy,' as the liberal professors and petty-bourgeois opportunists would have us believe. No, forward development, i.e., development towards communism, proceeds through the dictatorship of the proletariat, and cannot do otherwise, for the resistance of the capitalist exploiters cannot be broken by anyone else or in any other way.[16]

Thus, the American conception of democracy is not the Soviet's. Although Reagan would not say that fair and equal treatment--the Soviet criteria of democracy--are not part of American democracy, the guarantee of equal position and equal goods for all is not inherent to American democracy. Rather, a democracy guarantees the opportunity to pursue acquisition of such goods. Reagan emphasizes freedom, and thus he takes issue with the control and consequent apparent lack of freedom maintained by the Soviets to guarantee that equality. To Reagan freedom means lack of control; to Gorbachev it means liberty to build socialism. Progress means for Reagan capitalist progress, whereas for Gorbachev it means socialist progress.

The lack of understanding of the differing meanings for mutually stated ideals breeds distrust, suspicion, and hostility, for each leader in his lack of understanding of the other's framework sees the other's declarations as distortion and deception propagated to establish the supremacy of his nation's

ideals in the world. To speak as though they share an ideal of peace is to perpetuate misunderstanding and suspicion, which are antithetical to peace.

It seems clear that the road to peace will not be found in Gorbachev changing the ideals of Reagan, or vice versa. It also seems clear that whereas we all might agree that Gorbachev and Reagan ought to discursively analyze and assess the meanings and acceptability of the definitions of the ideals being argued from, this, too, is unlikely to take place. What will be more likely is that Reagan and Gorbachev will continue to frame their ideals constitutive of peace through their battles over the meanings of events, processes and pacts. The struggle over the meaning of peace will continue, and through their discursive interaction some understanding of each other's ideals may be realized. It would seem that the goal to be emphasized is neither that of changing ideals nor of attempting to discover unifying metaphors or ideals, for unifying ideals --such as peace--lose their force as they are brought into the material world of social practice. The divergence remains, only then it is mystified through the forced abstraction. Understanding, on the other hand, tends to dispel mystification and therein tends to allay suspicion and fear, and thus hostility, the grounds for war, creating the conditions of the possibility of cooperative and mutually beneficial relations between the two nations.

Employing the kind of message analysis used in this study we can discern what ideals are used as bases for arguments and how those ideals cluster together to make up fields of principles governing action. We cannot discern from this type of study the relationships between ideals and social practice or the nature of the discursive struggle over definition exhibited in the back and forth contest between the subjects. We also cannot see how ideals are created

in real social conditions and how they function to maintain and to change social practice. Neither can we see how social practice functions to create and maintain ideals. And yet, these are necessary steps to take in fostering greater understanding of how theory and practice intersect in discourse.

To make these steps, future research may be productively focused upon neo-Marxist critical theory, and ideology theory in particular. This approach can form a framework for gaining insight into the ideals as more than just ideas, but as forces central to discursive social practice. Ideology theory invites examination of the nature of the relationship between ideals and social practice that I have assumed in this study. We can explore the way ideals are informed by social practice and the way social practice is informed by ideals. Such understanding can foster the demystification necessary for the cultivation of truly peaceful relations between peoples.

End Notes

[1]Richard McKeon, "Communication, Truth and Society," Ethics, 67 (January 1957), p. 99.

[2]Hereafter Strategic Defense Initiative will be referred to as SDI.

[3]Ronald Reagan, "Transcript of Second Inaugural Address by Reagan," The New York Times, January 22, 1985, p. A17; Mikhail Gorbachev. "Speech by Comrade Gorbachev, General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, at the CPSU Central Committee Plenum" (text). Moscow Pravda (12 March 1985) p. 3. Translation by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report--Soviet Union Vol. 9:3; 12 March 1985. (GPO Microfiche, pp. R2-R6).

[4]Ronald Reagan, "Transcript of Speech by the President at St. John's University," The New York Times, March 29, 1985, p. B4; Mikhail Gorbachev, "Gorbachev Speech (Speech by Mikhail Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, at his meeting with the collective of the Petrovsky Metallurgical Works in the Metallurgists' Palace of Culture in Dnepropetrovsk)" (text), Moscow Television Service in Russian, 1700 GMT 26 June 1985. Translation by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report--Soviet Union Vol. 9:6; 27 June 1985. (GPO Microfiche pp. R1-R14).

[5]Ronald Reagan, "Transcript of Reagan's Speech at Air Base After His Visit to the Cemetary," The New York Times, May 5, 1985, p. I, 8:1; Mikhail Gorbachev. "Gorbachev Speech at 9 May Kremlin Reception" (text). Moscow Pravda (10 May 1985) p. 1. Translation by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report--Soviet Union Vol. 9:5; 10 May 1985. (GPO Microfiche pp. R-1-R5).

[6]Ronald Reagan, "Transcript of Reagan Report to Congress," The New York Times, November 22, 1985, p. A14; Mikhail Gorbachev, "Excerpts From Gorbachev News Session: 'All Have a State,'" The New York Times, November 22, 1985, p. A16.

[7]Mikhail Gorbachev, "Excerpts From Speech by Gorbachev to Parliament," The New York Times, November 28, 1985, p. A4.

[8]Ronald Reagan, "Transcript of President's Speech on Summit Talks Next Week," The New York Times, November 15, 1985, p. A10.

[9]Michael J. Buckley, S.J., "Philosophic Method in Cicero," Journal of the History of Philosophy 8 (1970), p. 143.

[10]De Oratore, III,16,61; in Loeb Classical Library edition.

[11]Ibid., III,16,60.

[12]Richard McKeon, "Discussion and Resolution in Political Conflicts," Ethics 64 (1944), p. 237.

[13]Ibid., p. 238.

[14]Buckley, p. 149.

[15]Carol A. Berthold, "Kenneth Burke's Cluster-Agoan Method: Its Developmetn and an Application," The Central States Speech Journal, 27 (Winter 1976), pp. 302-309.

[16]Lenin, The State and Revolution, in The Lenin Anthology, Robert C. Tucker, ed. (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc. 1975), p. 319.